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THE REGISTRATION OF COMMUNIST-FRONT ORGAN-
IZATIONS: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AN]) THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE
Because the Communist movement cannot attain all its goals through
the single instrumentality of the Communist Party, it frequently resorts
to the use of organizations which operate under Communist instruction,
but are not openly associated with the Communist Party or the Com-
munist movement. Lacking the broad purposes of the Party, these groups
are utilized by the Communist movement for more specific aims. Their
primary purpose is to extend Communist influence into areas where an
openly Communist appeal would not receive support, a task they seek to
accomplish by concealing their true goals behind a "high-sounding and
attractive reform objective." 1 Appeals are aimed at narrow groups, with
emphasis placed upon such factors as occupation,2 race,; religion,4 and,
most frequently, specific political causes. 5
Front organizations are most often established by a small group of
party sympathizers who will then undertake a general canvas of the popu-
lace for supporters.6 This nucleus will usually install as president a promi-
nent figure who either will go along with the Communists, or will function
as a mere figurehead.7 In the latter case, an executive committee 8 or an
executive secretary 9 will be the actual guiding force of the organization,
and these positions will be filled by Communists or Communist sympa-
I See STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., IST SESS.,
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmmcA-WHAT IT Is-How IT
WORKS-A HANDBOOK FOR AMEIuCANS 90 (Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter cited as
COMMUNIsT PARTY].
2 COMMUNIST PARTY 91 (naming as examples the National Lawyers Guild and
the Photo League).
3 Id at 92 (naming as examples the United Negro and Allied Veterans of America,
the Council on African Affairs, and the National Negro Labor Council).
4Ibid. (naming as examples the Methodist Federation for Social Action and the
American Jewish Labor Council).
5 Id. at 91 (naming as examples the National Council of American-Soviet
Friendship, the Trade Union Committee for the Repeal of the Smith Act, the Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and others). It should be noted that the National
Council was found by the Subversive Activities Control Board to be a Communist
front and ordered to register under the Internal Security Act. This finding was
reversed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See text accompanying
notes 50-51 infra.
6 See National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. SACB, 322 F2d
375, 381-83, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1963); COMMUNIST PARTY 93.
7 See ibid.; cf. National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. SACB,
supra note 6, at 389.
8 See COMMUNIST PARTY 93; cf. National Council of American-Soviet Friendship,
Inc. v. SACB, 322 F.2d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
9 See American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 331 F.2d 53,
55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curiam for stale record, 85 Sup.
Ct. 1148 (1965); COMMUNIST PARTY 93.
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thizers. Less commonly, an organization independently formed will be
taken over by the Party, and the positions of power will be assigned to
Party members or sympathizers. 10 These procedures guarantee that the
particular organization will remain an instrument of the Communist Party."
I. THE INTERNAL SECURITY AcT oF 1950
The Internal Security Act of 1950 sought to inform the public of
the connection between various organizations and the Communist move-
ment.'2 Its principal provisions require the registration of communist-front
and communist-action organizations. 3  These groups are defined in the
following terms:
"Communist-front organizations" means any organization in
the United States (other than a Communist-action organization
* . . ) which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or con-
trolled by a Communist-action organization and (B) is primarily
operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to a Com-
munist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or
the world Communist movement . . . . 4
"Communist-action organization" means-(a) any organiza-
tion . . . which (i) is substantially directed, dominated or con-
trolled by the foreign government or foreign organization con-
trolling the world Communist movement . . . and (ii) operates
primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement . . . and (b) any section, branch, fraction or cell of
any organization defined in subparagraph (a) . . . .
A 1954 amendment extended the registration requirement to communist-
infiltrated organizations. The third statutory class includes all organiza-
tions which are substantially directed, dominated or controlled by an indi-
vidual or individuals who are, or who within the last three years have
been, aiding or supporting a communist-action organization, a foreign
government, or the world Communist movement.
16
Several consequences flow from a final order to register. To begin
with, an organization subject to such an order'must file a statement con-
10 See id. at 90.
"1 See Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64, 70
(D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curam for stale record, 85 Sup. Ct.
1153 (1965); American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 331 F.2d
53, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curtan for stale record, 85 Sup.
Ct 1148 (1965).
12 See McCarran, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. Pr. L. REv. 481
(1951).
1'64 Stat. 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §786 (1958). The act defines the point at
which a Board order becomes final. 64 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1958).
'464 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §782(4) (1958).
15 64 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(3) (1958).
1668 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (4A) (1958).
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taining the name of the organization and the address of its principal office;
the names and last known addresses of its officers; an accounting, as pre-
scribed by the Attorney General, of all moneys received and expended;
and, in the case of a communist-action organization, the names and ad-
dresses of all members of the organization.1
7
The statute further prescribes certain restrictions to be imposed upon
the members of an organization subject to a final order to register. Al-
though one of these restrictions-denial of passport rights to members "8
-was recently held to be an unconstitutional infringement upon the liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth amendment,19 statutory
provisions still restrict the employment of these individuals at defense
facilities or with the Government. 20
Severe restrictions are also imposed upon the associations which are
ordered to register. They must label all mail and broadcasts as having
been disseminated by a Communist organization. 21  They lose any tax-
exempt status 22 with the consequence that their contributors can no longer
claim tax deductions for gifts to the organization. Moreover, a ten thou-
sand dollar fine is imposed for each failure to register after an order has
become final, and each day is considered a separate failure.p Thus far,
however, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination has pre-
vented the Government from devising a successful method for penalizing
an organization for a failure to register.
2 4
This Note will examine the constitutionality of subjecting communist-
front organizations to such restrictions. In order to gain perspective,
consideration will first be directed to the registration proceedings, with
particular emphasis being placed upon the statutory issues and practical
problems raised in such litigation.
II. COMMUNIST FRONTS AND THE REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
A. Litigation History
The initial determination of whether an association is a communist-
front, communist-action, or communist-infiltrated organization is made by
the Subversive Activities Control Board, which hears suits brought by
17 64 Stat 993-94 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(d) (1958).
18 64 Stat 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
19 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
20 64 Stat 992 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1958). It has been suggested that
since there is no right to Government employment, the Government may constitution-
ally impose reasonable conditions on its availability. See Note, 51 COLUm. L. REv.
606, 624 (1951); cf. 96 CoNG. REc. 13732 (1950) (remarks of Representative Case).
2164 Stat. 996 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 789 (1958). Compare Lamont v. Postmaster
General, 85 Sup. Ct. 1493 (1965).
2264 Stat 996-97 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 790 (1958). Since there is no right to a
tax exemption, or to a tax deduction, these provisions probably raise no serious
constitutional issues. See Note, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 606, 624 (1951).
2364 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1958).
24See Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 968 (1964); cf. Communist Party v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 325
(D.C. Cir. 1964). See generally Note, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 394 (1964), for a discus-
sion of the problems involved in registration of associations.
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the Attorney General 2 5 Board registration orders may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,26 but the findings of
the Board, if supported by a preponderance of the evidence, are con-
clusive
2
From the adoption of the act to the end of 1963, the Attorney General
had initiated twenty-three registration proceedings against alleged com-
munist-front organizations, two proceedings against alleged communist-
infiltrated groups, and one proceeding against an alleged communist-action
group.2 8 The last litigation began in 1950, and after extended Board and
court proceedings, the Supreme Court finally affirmed the Board's regis-
tration order in 1961.
Several significant factors appear from a review of these proceedings.
It took the Board, on the average, a little under three years to dispose of
a case from the time the Attorney General instituted proceedings. The
time span between initiation of the proceedings and final disposition has
averaged a little less than six years, and two cases are still pending after
registration orders were vacated by the Supreme Court. In two cases
the Board held that it lacked jurisdiction because of dissolution of the
organization; in five cases it granted a petition of the Attorney General
for dismissal without prejudice because of mootness, the Attorney General
retaining the right to institute new proceedings; and in two other cases
motions of the Attorney General to dismiss were granted. Excluding
these nine cases, the average Board determination took a little less than
three an one-half years, and the average time to final determination took
a little more than nine years.
These figures, however, are not necessarily predictive of the length
of future litigation, since several of the cases were held in abeyance by the
court of appeals pending the final Supreme Court decision in the Com-
munist Party case. Eliminating the time between the Board order and
the Supreme Court decision in that case, the average time from the initi-
ation of proceedings by the Attorney General to the final disposition of
the litigation becomes a little less than four years. However, excluding
the nine cases mentioned above, the average time becomes a little less
than six years. This figure appears to be the best indication of the average
time consumed in communist-front litigation, and affects the issues of moot-
ness, stale evidence, and constitutionality, factors which will be discussed
below.
2z64 Stat. 998 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792 (1958). The act also provides for
voluntary registration by a communist-action group or a Communist front, 64 Stat.
993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(a), (b) (1958), but no organization has yet voluntarily
registered.
2664 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1958). The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals may in its discretion transfer the action to the circuit where the
petitioner resides.
2764 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §793(a) (1958).
28 The information in this section was derived from the reports of the Subversive
Activities Control Board and the reported opinions of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals.
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Besides the time factor there is a somewhat more tenuous inference
which may be drawn from these facts relative to the Board's disposition
of these cases. Of the twenty-three "front" and "infiltrated" cases decided
by the Board, registration was ordered in fifteen-one of these subsequently
being mooted by the court of appeals upon motion of the Attorney General.
In the eight others, the Board independently found that it had no juris-
diction in two because of dissolution of the alleged front, and dismissed
the other six on petition of the Attorney General, four of those six being
dismissed without prejudice and reserving in the Attorney General the
right to institute new proceedings. Thus, of the seventeen cases of which
the Board independently disposed of, it found for the Attorney General
in fifteen, and it found it had no jurisdiction on the ground of dissolution
in two.
Only twelve of the fifteen registration orders handed down by the
Board were appealed. Four of these were found to have become moot
and were thus not affirmed but rather placed in an "indefinitely inactive
status." Of the remaining eight, one was reversed, no appeal was allowed
in another since the organization had dissolved and thus could not appeal,
and six were affirmed. All issues were litigated in only two of these six,
and both of those cases were remanded by the Supreme Court to take
new evidence, the Court holding that the orders were based on stale records.
The decisions in the other four cases were more restrictive: on appeal, the
court decided in two cases only that the showing of dissolution had been
insufficient, in one that there was an insufficient showing of dissolution
and no constitutional basis for reversal, and in the last that there was no
constitutional basis for reversal. Thus, of the twenty-three cases instituted
by the Attorney General, only seven have so far resulted in final regis-
tration orders, and only two of these seven were completely litigated in
a court.
In light of the paucity of instances of complete court review of the
Board orders it is difficult to argue that the Board has rubber stamped
the Attorney General's determinations. There may, however, be some
credence to such a charge, since of the seventeen cases the Board has de-
cided independently of the Attorney General, it has found for the Attorney
General in fifteen, the other two having been decided on jurisdictional
grounds. Court disposal has been too inconclusive to establish any pattern.
Of the twelve cases which have been appealed, only six have been affirmed,
but only two of these were complete litigations of all issues; and in five
of the six which were not affirmed the court's decision was based solely
on dissolution. Finally, in the one case reversed, the reversal was on the
merits. Thus the court of appeals has decided the merits in only three
cases, and has affirmed the Board in two. The Board, on the other hand,
has found for the Attorney General in all fifteen cases it has disposed of
on the merits. These figures are insufficient for any definite conclusions
about the leanings of the Board, but they do indicate that the Attorney
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General apparently has a more sympathetic forum in the Board than in
the courts. The Supreme Court's disposition of the two latest orders
indicates that it will demand more of the Government-at least on evi-
dentiary problems-than either the Board or the court of appeals has
thus far.
B. Statutory Requirements and Practicalities
1. Instability of Legal Entities
Because the statutory provisions dealing with front organizations re-
quire registration of legal entities rather than of individuals, it is often
necessary to determine whether an organization is still extant at the close
of the registration proceedings or at the time of appeal. This problem
is especially difficult where the organization ordered to register is unincor-
porated, for no easily ascertainable legal standard of existence is available
in such a situation. The requirement of a legal entity appears to provide
a means by which an organization could evade registration by simply dis-
banding upon the issuance of an order, and thereafter reorganizing in a
new guise. If such a course of action were allowed, the Government
would be seriously limited in its efforts to implement the statutory purpose.
While a defendant should not be permitted to moot a proceeding by
its own voluntary acts,29 the court in the communist-front cases recognized
that a different situation is presented when the organization ordered to
register carries the burden of proof as to mootness. The court refused
to affirm the registration orders in those cases and remanded the cases
to the Board with orders to place them in "indefinitely inactive status." 8 0
The court's refusal to affirm was based on two grounds. To begin with,
it argued that any order entered would be without identifiable substance,
since it would lack either present or foreseeable effect upon any party to
the proceedings. This reasoning is justified both by the statutory language,
which is addressed to the present, and by the registration provision's
design not to penalize, but rather to expose the organization to the public.
The second ground-the effect on the members of an organization ordered
to register-presents a broader argument against registration. When a
registration order becomes final the act immediately places certain restric-
tions on the members of the front. Since the act does not provide a way
for individuals to challenge an order, the continued existence of the latter
after dissolution of the organization threatens members with penalties
without affording them adequate protection. A member could, for example,
be discharged or refused employment by the Government or by a defense
29See Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944).
30 See, e.g., Haufrecht v. SACB, 322 F.2d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Blau v. SACB,
322 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Labor Youth League v. SACB, 322 F.2d 364 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). In several cases the court rejected the argument of mootness. See, e.g.,
Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB, 331 F.Zd 76 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Patterson
v. SACB, 322 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1963); California Labor School, Inc. v. SACB,
322 F.2d 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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facility because of an order, and have no way to clear his name by court
proceedings.31
Although the court would not affirm the orders, it refused to dismiss
the cases for mootness. Remanding and placing the order in an "indefi-
nitely inactive status," it preserved the entire Board record, and left open
the possibility that the record would be reopened and the registration order
issued again if the organization were reactivated.
An alternative solution to the problems in this area was advanced
by the court of appeals in Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB,
32
in which the court added to the organization's burden as to mootness the
necessity of showing that the organization had not been reorganized under
a new name. Although the court carefully indicated that it was not de-
ciding if the Board order would apply to the presently existing organiza-
tion,33 it apparently gave its approval to a Board-formulated criteria which
treated both organizations as identical for all purposes-3 This ruling
might indicate that any organization which resembles a group earlier held
to be a front will be required to register without benefit of litigation, thus
being subjected to the penalties of the act without any hearing at all. It
need hardly be added that such an approach would be seriously deficient.
2. Court Review of the Board
a. Stale Evidence
The prolongation of front registration proceedings has created an-
other difficulty for the courts. Because the statute was interpreted as
operating in the present, the court of appeals required the proof to be
related to the present. However, the court did accept evidence of past
activities as having probative value for the present.35 This was of great
significance in the litigated cases, since the Board findings were related
to events occurring no later than the mid-fifties. The court was con-
cerned by the lack of evidence relating to the more immediate present,
but this was not felt sufficient to sustain a reversal of a Board order to
register.3 6 The court, however, rejected the argument that a showing of
membership in the Communist Party during World War II was sufficient
evidence to establish membership in the early fifties, in view of the changed
political climate3 7  But this limitation only applied to the timeliness of
evidence at the Board hearings, and was not extended to require showing
31 See Labor Youth League v. SACB, supra note 30, at 372-73.
32 331 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
33 Id. at 81.
34 See id. at 85 (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
35 See, e.g., Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 331 F.2d 64,
68 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curiam for stale record, 85 Sup. Ct.
1153 (1965).
36 See Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, Mtpra note 35, at 72-73.
37 See National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. SACB, 322 F.2d
375, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
COMMUNIST-FRONT REGISTRATION
relation to the time of court review, despite the fact that there may also
have been fluctuations in the political climate during the years between
the Board findings and court review.
The Supreme Court, in both the communist-front cases which reached
it, vacated the registration orders on the ground that the records were too
stale to form the basis for a registration order. The Court indicated that
it would require not only that the evidence be timely in relation to the
time of the Board hearings, which seemingly was the sole test of the court
of appeals, but also that "reasonably current aid and control must be
established to justify a registration order." 38 This means that the Govern-
ment will have to keep its case timely through the entire litigation, which, in
view of the time gap between board orders and court proceedings, may make
the statute virtually unworkable.
b. Limitations on Court Review
In the Internal Security Act Congress specifically provided that
Board findings of fact were to be upheld on review only where "the pre-
ponderance of the evidence" supports them,3 9 and not where there is
merely "substantial evidence" reinforcing them. The legislative history
indicates that this broad scope of review was granted to give greater pro-
tection to the individuals or organizations concerned, because political
rather than economic rights were involved.40 There are, however, practical
limits to court review of the Board's findings of fact. In National Council
of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v. SACB,41 for example, the court
indicated that since the record was so voluminous and unannotated, it
would be under no obligation to consider portions of the record other than
those cited by the parties.
A further limitation on effectivetcourt review is the vagueness of the
statutory criteria. These criteria are:42
(1) the extent to which persons who are active in its [the
front's] management, direction, or supervision, whether or not
holding office therein, are active in the management, direction, or
supervision of, or as representatives of, any Communist-action
organization, Communist foreign government, or the world Com-
munist movement . . . ; and
(2) the extent to which its support, financial or otherwise,
is derived from any Communist-action organization, Communist
38 American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 85 Sup. Ct. 1148,
1149 (1965).
3964 Stat. 1001 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1958); see 94 CONG. REc. 6134-37
(1948); 96 CoNG. REc. 13765 (1950) (remarks of Representative Nixon); id. at
14531 (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
40 See ibid.
41322 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
4264 Stat 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 792(f) (1958).
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foreign government, or the world Communist movement . . .
and
(3) the extent to which its funds, resources, or personnel
are used to further or promote the objectives of any Communist-
action organization, Communist foreign government, or the world
Communist movement . . . ; and
(4) the extent to which the positions taken or advanced by
it from time to time on matters of policy do not deviate from those
of any Communist-action organization, Communist foreign govern-
ment, or the world Communist movement .... 43
The legislative history of the act indicates that all of these factors must be
taken into consideration, but contains no indication of what weight, if any,
is to be given to each.44 Thus court reversal of the Board is nearly im-
possible.
Another restriction on court review is provided by the possible finan-
cial inability of an organization to carry an appeal to the courts.45 When
such a condition exists, the Board's finding is in fact unreviewable. Illus-
trative of the problem is Weinstock v. SACB,46  which involved a
registration order against the United May Day Committee. There the
organization appealed solely on constitutional arguments taken from a
brief in another front case, since it could not afford to retain an attorney
to present any other arguments. Thus the organization had no court
review of the factual findings of the Board, and the board order was
affirmed after the constitutional arguments in the incorporated brief had
been rejected.
C. Statutory Definition of a Communist Front
1. Control Element
The statutory definition of a Communist front includes the two ele-
ments of control and purpose. To be labelled as a communist-front, an
organization must first be found to be "substantially directed, dominated
or controlled by a communist-action organization." 47  Since the element
of control is extremely difficult to prove, the Supreme Court in the Com-
inunist Party case held that the Government was not obliged to show that
43 This last criteria was one of the most debated provisions in the act, and the
one the opponents of the act most severely criticized. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 13735-40
(1950) (remarks of Representative Celler) ; id. at 13766 (remarks of Representative
O'Hara) ; id. at 14192-3 (remarks of Senator Lehman); id. at 14196 (remarks of
Senator Humphrey) ; id. at 15678 (remarks of Senator Douglas).
44 See 96 CoNG. REc. 14408-9 (1950) (remarks of Senator Douglas) ; id. at 14531
(remarks of Senator Graham).
45 See CHAFEE, THE BLEssINGs OF LIBERTY 143 (1956).
46331 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
4764 Stat. 989 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1958).
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the foreign government had power to enforce obedience to its will. The
Court held sufficient proof of a consistent disposition, over an extended
period of time, to follow the policies of the foreign government regardless
of their content.48 For purposes of front litigations, it was also held that
the Communist Party was a communist-action organization.49 In National
Council of American-Soviet Friendship v. SACB,50 the court reversed
the Board where the evidence showed only that the managers of the asso-
ciation were Party members and failed to show that they were either active
in the management of the Party or acting as its representatives. To be
classified as a communist-front, the court held, a group must be substan-
tially directed by a communist-action organization, and not merely by
members of such a group. The Board's contention that all members of
the Party act as its representatives was rejected as both unrealistic and
destructive of the distinction between a communist-front and a communist-
infiltrated organization. 51 That distinction would indeed appear to imply
that before the much broader sanctions 52 applicable to a communist-front
organization can be invoked, a far greater linkage must be shown to 5.
communist-action group than is provided by a mere overlap of membership.
2. Purpose Element
The statute includes a second element in its definition of a Communist
front: an organization must be "primarily operated for the purpose of
giving aid and support to a communist-action organization, a Communist
foreign government, or the world Communist movement . . . ." 5 Al-
though the court of appeals has had to deal with this provision in only two
cases, different views of the section have already emerged.
In American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACBM4 the
defendant, through legal action and propaganda, concerned itself primarily
with the defense of individuals involved in deportation and denaturalization
proceedings. Those defended were not all members of the Communist
Party, but the court apparently accepted the testimony of immigration
officers before the Board that the "bulk" of the cases involved Party
membersYn 5 The propaganda activities of the Committee also contained
48 Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 39-42 (1961) ; The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 80, 105 (1961) ; 26 ALBANxY L. REV. 95, 98 (1962).
49 See, e.g., Jefferson School of Social Science v. SACB, 331 F.2d 76, 82-83
(D.C. Cir. 1963). This conclusion was based upon the premise that once it was shown
that an organization was controlled by the Party, the privity between that organization
and the Party made the holding in the Communist Party case res judicata.
50 322 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
51 See note 16 stipra and accompanying text for the statutory definition of a
communist-infiltrated organization.
62 The major restriction on communist-infiltrated organizations is that the mem-
bers cannot become officers or hold employment with any labor organization. 68
Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 784(1) (E) (1958).
r3 64 Stat. 989-90 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1958).
• 331 F.2d 53 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curiam for stale record,
85 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1965).
55 331 F2d at 60.
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what the court characterized as "notable Party overtones." 56 Moreover,
it was found that the aims of the Committee were aims of the Communist
Party
7
In Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 8 the appel-
lant claimed that its chief activities were social affairs, statements in oppo-
sition to the Franco regime, rehabilitation of Brigade members in need of
aid, support of members indicted under the Smith Act, and defense of
itself in the registration proceedings.5 9 The court viewed the evidence
as showing that the Brigade's principal interest was the defense of two
members indicted under the Smith Act, with opposition to Franco next
in importance.6 0 What ostensibly were social gatherings were held to have
been conducted principally for the defense of a member indicted under
the Smith Act. The court noted that admission was charged, collections
were taken up, and impassioned pleas were made in his behalf. 6' The
Brigade publication charged the Truman administration "with all sorts
of misdoing in its relations with Franco," 62 made "continuous attacks on
the Internal Security Act, Senator McCarran, the Un-American Activities
Committee, the Wall Street Imperialists, and all warmongers," and de-
manded cessation of the Korean War.P The court characterized all of
these activities as aims and purposes of the Communist Party.6
a. Extent of Illegal Activities
The statute requires an organization which is to be classified as a
Communist front to be operated "primarily" for the purpose of aiding
and supporting certain Communist groups or causes.6 5 In American
Committee the majority opinion suggested that the word "primarily"
may only mean "substantially," 66 citing as its sole support a Supreme
Court decision 6 7 construing the word "primarily" in a section of the
1933 Banking Act. In dissent, Judge Bazelon gave "primarily" the
meaning of "principally" or "chiefly," stressing that the word "substan-
tially" was used by Congress in the immediately preceding "control" section
of the definition.6 8  However, the majority's construction may in practice
not differ greatly from that of Judge Bazelon, since the court, in discussing
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
-8 331 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1963), vacated and remanded per curiam for stale
record, 85 Sup. Ct. 1153 (1965).
59 Id. at 66.
60 Id. at 72.




6564 Stat. 989, (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4) (1958).
66 331 F.2d at 57.
67 Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
68 331 F.2d at 61 n.2.
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the facts in American Committee, referred to a "major portion" of the
efforts of the organization. 9 If the court will require a showing that a
"majority" of an organization's actions have the proscribed purpose, the
differences from Judge Bazelon's formulation become imperceptible.
Nevertheless, Judge Bazelon's criticism of the majority interpretation is
supported by the only legislative history on this point. In arguing that the
act was constitutional, Senator Ferguson, whose earlier bill was one of those
which formed the basis for the act, underscored the word "primarily" and
pointed out that it had been deliberately used to narrow the reach of the
statute.70 Thus the majority's suggestion that "primarily" may be inter-
preted to mean "substantially" should be rejected by the Supreme Court.
It is important to note, however, that these differing interpretations
had no effect on the outcome in either case. In Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade, the court did not even advert to this point; in American
Committee, after stating that "primarily" may mean "substantially," the
court never again referred to the issue. It is thus difficult to assert with
confidence what the court regards "primarily" to include. Even if the
differences in interpretation are regarded as significant, however, the
impact on future cases will probably be negligible, since most of the
organizations involved are devoted almost exclusively to a single set of
activities.
b. The Object of the Organization's Activities
In the two cases in which the court specifically dealt with the purpose
element, none of the activities which the organization pursued were in
themselves illegal. Recognizing this, the majority in Veterans of the
Abraham Lincoln Brigade phrased the purpose test in the following manner:
When a person, or an organization, actively presses objectives
which are objectives of the Communist Party, does he do so as
a matter of independent conviction, or does he do so by reason
of substantial direction or control by the Communist Party and
for the purpose of giving aid and support to the party? 7
1
Although the court did not refer to this test in American Committee,
that opinion does state that the act "seeks the registration of any organi-
zation the purpose of which, under control of the Party, by any activity,
laudable or otherwise, is to strengthen the power of the Communist Party
in this country." 72 There would thus seem to be a merging in both
opinions of the control and purpose elements. Indeed, the court never
treats the latter as a truly separate and independent component, and devotes
69 Id. at 57.
70 96 CONG. R.. 14530 (1950) (remarks of Senator Ferguson).
71331 F.2d at 72.
72 Id. at 58.
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the bulk of its opinions to the control factor. Nor do the majority differ-
entiate between activities which are or are not protected by the first amend-
ment, reading the purpose element literally as asking only whether the
organization is operated for the purpose of giving aid and support to the
Communist Party.
Judge Bazelon dissented in both American Committee and Veterans
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, contending that the majority had mis-
construed the purpose element. Judge Bazelon's construction rests upon
the premise that only those activities which advance the world Communist
movement's objective to overthrow the Government and to replace it with
a totalitarian dictatorship bring the Communist Party within the statutory
definition of a communist-action organization. Accordingly, a front is
seen as an organization operated for the purpose of aiding a communist-
action organization in such activities.
This restricted construction was seen by Judge Bazelon as a way of
avoiding serious constitutional problems raised by the majority position.
Since Bazelon believed that the registration of the Communist Party was
sustained only because that organization was operated primarily for the
purpose of overthrowing the Government and establishing a totalitarian
dictatorship, he doubted that registration could be required of an organi-
zation-such as a Communist front under the majority definition-which
pursued other aims. Furthermore, he pointed to the severe and identical
penalties imposed upon both Communist fronts and communist-action
organizations, arguing that Congress had no intention of inflicting them
upon members of an organization which is pursuing legal aims, but which,
unknown to them, is controlled by the Communist Party.
Judge Bazelon's construction of the purpose element seems a strained
reading of the statute, for the act apparently covers any type of purpose to
aid the Communist movement. Indeed, the act was designed to ferret
out all Communist-influenced organizations, not just those directly seeking
to overthrow the Government. Communist fronts, moreover, are particu-
larly difficult for the public to identify, yet in some degree they operate
to support the Communist movement. Judge Bazelon's test, however,
would make communist-front organizations virtually indistinguishable from
communist-action organizations, allowing many groups to escape the regis-
tration requirement although the act clearly intended broader coverage.73
Finally, the severity of penalties seems an inadequate reason for a narrow
definition of a front organization, since the act requires production of
membership lists only in the case of communist-action organizations. Such
an approach recognizes that there will often be innocent members in a
front organization, advancing what to them are legal objectives.74 The
innocent individual could thus remain anonymous and sever his connection
with the group upon learning of an order to register.
73 See McCarran, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 12 U. PnT. L. REv. 481
(1951).
74 Compare Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510-11 (1964).
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Although there are admittedly severe effects on members of a front
organization ordered to register, such effects can to a great extent be
mitigated by voluntary withdrawal. Moreover, in overemphasizing the
effects on the members, Judge Bazelon seems to have lost sight of Congress'
basic aim, which was to affect the organization as a tool of the Communist
movement. Judge Bazelon's desire to avoid the constitutional questions by
narrowly construing the act seems inappropriate in this instance, for where
the effect of a narrow construction would be to emasculate a statute, the
constitutional issue should be directly confronted, rather than avoided.
The majority's construction of the purpose provision seems more
consonant with the statutory intent.75 Although the statute, because it
contains a specific purpose criterion, cannot strictly be interpreted to say
that all groups controlled by communist-action organizations have the
requisite purpose, the practical effect of a reading which relegates the
purpose element to a minor role would still appear sound, as an organiza-
tion controlled by a communist-action group will nearly always have as its
purpose the aid and support of that group. The majority formulation
would thus seem to come closer to congressional intent than that of Judge
Bazelon, and its test will effectuate the aim of the statute.
III. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND THE REGISTRATION
OF COMMUNIST FRONTS
In view of the severity of the restrictions imposed upon communist-
action and communist-front organizations by the Internal Security Act,
a collision with the constitutional doctrine of freedom of association seems
inevitable. While Congress was aware at the time of enactment that the
registration scheme presented first amendment problems, the Court had
not at that time fully articulated a concept of freedom of association. Sub-
sequent to passage of the act, however, the Court greatly expanded the
constitutional protection of associations and the registration provisions of
the act were first challenged in Communist Party v. SACB.76 In that
case, an order directing the registration of a communist-action organiza-
tion-the Communist Party-was held constitutional by the Court. Al-
though there were four dissents on the ground that the registration
requirement violated the fifth amendment freedom against self-incrimination,
only Justice Black dissented on the additional ground that the registration
75 The legislative history, however, is unclear. The question of Communist fronts
was the most debated one in the act, and the constitutionality of the registration
provision was continually questioned. There is a statement, by one of the bill's
supporters, that it is clear that the provisions for registration apply only to organi-
zations whose essential aims "are to further the objectives of a foreign government
or of the world Communist movement under the domination of foreign control"--this
at a time when the purpose element of the definition included giving aid and support
to a Communist political organization (the term in the Senate bill which was replaced
by communist-action organization in the enacted version)-but it is not clear whether
the speaker was addressing himself directly to an interpretation of the Communist
front provisions. 96 CoNG. Rm 14257 (1950) (remarks of Senator O'Conor).
76 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
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order was an unconstitutional infringement of first amendment rights. The
majority narrowly confined its holding to the validity of the registration
requirement, finding that it did not violate the first amendment freedoms
of expression and association. All other constitutional questions concern-
ing the operation of the statute were held to be raised prematurely since
Congress had provided a separability clause in the event that any part of
the act was held unconstitutional. Since this narrow decision by no means
settles the constitutionality of the registration of front organizations, 77 it is
necessary to review the development of the doctrine of freedom of associa-
tion in order to assess the constitutional position occupied by this decision
and its likely impact upon the registration of front organizations.
A. Freedom of Association
The recognition of freedom of association as a constitutionally protected
right is a relatively recent development.7" Claims for constitutional pro-
tection of associations were originally couched solely in terms of liberty
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and could thus
yield to a proper exercise of police power. In New York ex rel. Bryant
v. Ziminermann,79 for example, the Court passed upon the constitutionality
of a state statute that imposed a criminal penalty upon those retaining mem-
bership 'in the Ku Klux Klan with knowledge that the organization had
failed to comply with a state registration statute. The Court held that a
showing of nonarbitrariness and likely effectiveness was sufficient to sustain
the constitutionality of the statute in the face of an attack based on four-
teenth amendment liberty. Decided in 1928, Bryant remained as a strong
precedent against the development of a doctrine of freedom of association.
A significant change in the Court's attitude toward the scope of the
constitutional protection to be afforded associations appeared in Thomas
v. Collins,8" decided in 1945. In Thomas the Court held that a state statute
requiring a labor organizer to obtain a card before soliciting memberships
for his union could not constitutionally be applied to a speech by a union
official in which he invited his audience to join a union. The requirement
was held to be incompatible with the exercise of free speech and free
assembly. The significance of Thomas lay in the fact that a majority of
the Court viewed the constitutional rights of an association as emanating
from a broadly based first amendment freedom to express ideas. This
77 See American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 85 Sup. Ct.
1148, 1149 n.2 (1965).
78 The concept of freedom of association was first clearly enunciated in NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). For the early history of this
freedom, see generally FELLMAN, TE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT oF AssoCrATIoN 1-12
(1963). Fellman links the freedom to freedom of assembly. It seems, however, that
the concept is more related to freedom of speech, since it is a cognate of the first
amendment rights insuring freedom to express ideas. See text accompanying notes
81, 86 infra.
79278 U.S. 63 (1928).
80 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
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freedom was seen to encompass freedom of speech and freedom of assembly
in Thomas, and has now expanded to comprehend a freedom of association.
The expansion was a natural development once the Court recognized that
the rights protected by the first amendment are truly inseparable-that they
are cognate rights,81 all aiming at the protection of political expression.
Recognition was thus implicitly given in Thomas to the essential role that
freedom of association has in a present-day constitutional democracy,
where an individual can effectively function politically only if he is free to
associate without undue restraint.82 Although the case did not directly
involve freedom of association, it indicated that such a freedom was guar-
anteed by the first amendment, and that it was incorporated in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Freedom of association clearly emerged in several cases involving the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.3  In
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,s4 the first of these cases, the Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized that the freedom to associate for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty
assured by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that
any state action which may have the effect of curtailing this freedom will
be closely scrutinized. 85 Although the opinion speaks in terms of due
process under the fourteenth amendment, the Court made it clear that
through that amendment it was protecting the freedoms of the first amend-
ment from state infringement. Freedom of association has also been seen
as a derivative of the freedom to advance ideas, and thus linked to the
first amendment.8 6 Such a relationship indicates that a court must be
extremely careful to protect freedom of association when its infringement
is claimed.
87
The Court in NAACP v. Alabama failed to specify whether freedom
of association represented rights of the individual or of the organizational
entity. The primary concern of the Court appeared to be that the dis-
closure of membership lists as required by an Alabama statute would
expose the members to the possibility of adverse consequences, and thus
affect their ability to pursue collective efforts to foster beliefs they had the
right to advocate. 8 On the other hand, there was also thought to be a
reasonable likelihood that the association itself, through diminished finan-
SlId. at 530; Note, 27 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 653, 656 (1959).
82 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957) ; Fellman, Con-
stitutional Rights of Association, 1961 SuPRE= CouRT 'REv. 74, 133.
83 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) ; Bates v. City
of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
84 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
85 Id. at 460.
86 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960).
8 7 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958); cf.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937).
88 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, supra note 87, at 462-65.
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cial support and membership, would be adversely affected.89 In Bates v.
City of Little Rock,90 the Supreme Court resolved this issue by determin-
ing that the rights encompassed by freedom of association were those of the
individual,' and that harm to the association would be considered an in-
fringement of the rights of the individual members.
B. Limitations on Freedom of Association
Although freedom of association will be protected as a cognate of the
first amendment rights to advance beliefs, it still is subject to a balancing
test, 2 and where it conflicts with a greater public interest it may be con-
stitutionally subordinated. This restriction is identical to that placed on
freedom of speech, and is a corollary to all the first amendment freedoms
which protect expression of ideas.
1. Communism under the First Amendment
Communism and the Communist Party have occupied a unique posi-
tion in relation to the first amendment. Communist doctrine includes
forcible overthrow of the government, and when advocacy of forcible action
as opposed to advocacy of abstract doctrine, can be shown, such political
expression will not be given first amendment protection. Since the Com-
munist Party openly espouses Communist goals, it places itself and its
members in a position readily conducive to abridgement of their first
amendment freedoms.
90 3
In the Communist Party case, for example, the Court recognized that
a registration order and the various restrictions imposed by the act, which
were immediately operative upon the order's becoming final, would infringe
freedom of association by impairing a member's ability to espouse ideas
effectively through the association. The Court found, however, that the
interests of society in self-preservation outweighed the rights of the mem-
bers of the association, and registration was thus justified.
2. The Effect of the Infringement
Although a court is more apt to justify restrictions on the rights of
groups connected with Communism or the Communist Party than on
ordinary associations, it by no means follows that abridgement of first
amendment freedoms should be automatic where the Communist movement
89 Id. at 459-60.
90361 U.S. 516 (1960).
91 See Note, 27 GEo. WAsH. L. Rzv. 653, 672 (1959) ; cf. Douglas, The Right of
Association, 63 COLute. L. Rzv. 1361, 1378 (1963).
92 See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 80 (1959) ; Fellman, Constitutional Rights
of Association, 1961 SuPREmE CouRT Rzv. 74, 134.
'3 See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961); Communist
Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 104-05 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S.
109, 128 (1959); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950);
Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 968 (1964).
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is involved. The Communist Party case again may serve as an example,
for in that case the registration order itself would not have had as great
an effect on the association as disclosure of membership lists in the NAACP
cases would have had on the members of that organization. The Com-
munist Party did not contest the assertion that it was linked to the world
Communist movement, and the primary thrust of the registration require-
ment was the simple reaffirmation of that relationship; in the NAACP
cases, on the other hand, the members frequently desired to conceal their
membership, and disclosure could have exposed them to community
reprisal. The Communist Party ease thus appears to have been a fairly
easy one, and its implications, consequently limited. The case did, however,
involve by implication various restrictions which the act automatically
invokes when an order to register becomes final, and to this extent there
was much at stake for the association and its members.
That abridgement of first amendment rights even in this area will
require a careful weighing of interests is highlighted more clearly by com-
paring two recent cases. In the first, American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds,94 the Supreme Court held constitutional section 9(h) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,9 5 which required union leaders to file affidavits
disavowing any Communist affiliations. Failure to file such a statement
would deprive the union of some of the benefits of the act. The Court
based its decision on a determination that Congress could reasonably find
that Communists, unlike members of other political parties, pose a con-
stant threat of creating disruptive political strikes when they hold positions
of union leadership. In the second case, Brown v. United States,9 6 how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit found that the 1959 amendment to 9(h) 7 pro-
hibiting members of the Communist Party--or ex-members who have
terminated their membership within five years-from holding union
office violated freedom of association. The court distinguished Douds on
the somewhat questionable basis of the different effects these statutes had
on a Communist Party member's freedom of association. The court found
the Brown statute to be too broad a restriction of freedom of association,
analyzing it in terms of its general application and effect. In Douds the
penalty applied directly to the union-withdrawing its rights to the benefits
of the National Labor Relations Act. This sanction thus had only an
indirect effect on the Party member, by the pressure which it placed on
him through the union. In Brown, on the other hand, the sanction was a
criminal prosecution which had a direct effect on the Party member's
freedom of association. The court in Brown saw this direct effect as too
great an infringement of the member's freedom of association to be justified
by the congressional purpose, which was the same in both Brown and
9339 U.S. 382 (1950).
95 Ch. 120, 61 Stat. 146 (1947) (repealed by 73 Stat. 525 (1959)).
96334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir.), af'd, 85 Sup. Ct. 1707 (1965). In affirming the judg-
ment of the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court did not reach the first amendment
issue, but held instead that the statute was void as a bill of attainder.97 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 504, 73 Stat. 536 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. V, 1964).
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Douds. This indicates that despite the relatively weak claim of Communist
Party members to protection of their freedom of association, their rights
must still be outweighed by some other interests to sustain a finding of
infringement, and that the degree of the infringement will be a relevant
consideration in the disposition of a case.
3. Relation to the Communist Movement
Douds and Brown involved an infringement of rights because of Com-
munist Party membership. The question becomes a more difficult one
where the Communist Party itself is not openly involved. The immediacy
of the danger is not as apparent, and the evidentiary problems involved in
showing linkage will frequently be extremely difficult.
In Uphaus v. Wyman 8 the Supreme Court indicated a willingness
to permit states, through legislative investigations, to pry into the mem-
bership of associations alleged to be subversive.99 There was some evi-
dence to show a nexus between the association in question and subversive
activities, and although the Court did not regard the evidence as conclusive,
a majority held it sufficient to support a contempt conviction for failure
to produce guest lists of camp meetings.10 0 The Court in Uphaus stated
that the lists in question were matters of public knowledge by reason of
a guest registration statute to which camp visitors had voluntarily submitted.
It may thus be questioned whether freedom of association was involved at
all, since there may no longer have been any associational privacy to
protect.' 0 ' In addition, Uphaus may be seen as a case of an attempt to
identify individual subversives, similar to cases involving contempt con-
victions for refusing to answer questions concerning one's own past or
present membership in the Communist Party, 0 2 rather than as an in-
vestigation into the association itself.
In Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 0 3 decided after
the Uphaus case, the Court found an insufficient nexus between the NAACP
and subversive activities to sustain a contempt conviction for refusal to
divulge the contents of membership records of the Florida branch of the
NAACP to a Florida legislative committee investigating infiltration of
Communists into various organizations. In Gibson the evidence linking
the NAACP with subversive activities was characterized by the Court as
indirect, less than unequivocal, and mostly hearsay.'04 The majority spoke
in terms of nexus, and would not go so far as to overrule the underlying
98360 U.S. 72 (1959).
99 See Fellman, Constitutional Rights of Association, 1961 SUPREmE CoURT REv.
74, 121.
100 The dissenters were Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas
and Brennan, all of whom are still on the court. Two members of the then majority,
Justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, have since left the court.
101 See Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 550
(1963).
102 Ibid. Compare Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961) ; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
103 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
o10 Id. at 555.
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rationale of Uphaus that freedom of association may bow to legislative
investigations even though the organization is pursuing activities which are
protected by the first amendment. However, it is important to note that
the majority, because of their resolution of the evidentiary issues, was not
forced to face the constitutional issue. It is possible, however, that the
resolution of the evidentiary issues was to some extent influenced by the
factual context of the case, as the Court has shown a great solicitude for
protecting the NAACP in the South.
Unlike Uphaus and Gibson, the Communist Party case did not present
factual issues of linkage of the Party with the Communist movement.
Congress itself had incorporated into the Internal Security Act legislative
findings of the existence of a worldwide Communist movement whose aims
included the overthrow of the Government, and which employed sub-
versive methods to accomplish its goals. The Court did not question these
findings, since they were amply documented by evidence accumulated in
congressional investigations.'0 5 Moreover, the board finding that the
Communist Party was a communist-action organization was not seriously
contested.
The Court recognized that a registration requirement as an incident
to or a condition of the exercise of free speech may be unconstitutional,
but found that the statute did not attach the registration requirement to
an incident of speech, but rather to the incidents of foreign domination and
activities in advancement of the objectives of the world Communist move-
ment. Through this language the Court seemed to be balancing interests,
concluding that the magnitude of the governmental interest involved-self-
preservation-justified the registration requirement. The Court also sug-
gested that the concern for self-preservation would justify the disclosure
of member's names. However, this suggestion was dictum, for at the outset
of its opinion the Court was careful to point out that it was considering
only the registration requirement itself, and not all the consequences which
occur immediately upon a final order to register. The limited scope of the
Communist Party case was made evident in Aptheker v. Secretary of
State,0 6 where the Court held unconstitutional a denial of passport rights
to a member of the Communist Party following a final order to register.
C. Front Registration and the Constitution
1. The Constitutional Balance
a. The Effect on the Association
Destruction of the organization is the likely effect of a registration
order upon a Communist front.1 7 Because such organizations do not
105 See generally Note, 51 COLUm. L. REV. 606, 609-15 (1951), indicating that
this is a not infrequent practice.
106 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
107 See CHAFFE, THE BryzssrNGs oF LiBnERY 155 (1956). The author points out
that by merely filing a petition with the Board, the Attorney General can put an
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operate in secret, their membership is either known or can easily be dis-
covered. Consequently, the adverse publicity generated by a registration
order would probably force the resignation of almost all non-Communist
members. It might be argued that these individuals would resign upon
learning of the Communist control even if there were no registration re-
quirement. However, there might be members so dedicated to the organ-
ization's cause that they would retain their membership regardless of Com-
munist control were it not for the coercive publicity engendered by a regis-
tration order.
When combined with the concomitant loss of tax-exempt status, the
loss of membership will also decrease the financial resources of the asso-
ciation. In the NAACP cases the Supreme Court recognized that gov-
ernment action which diminishes financial support and membership abridges
an individual's freedom of association.0 8 Moreover, a registration order
will to some extent impair the association's ability to have its ideas accepted,
as the present political climate leads to an automatic prejudice against ideas
linked with Communism.
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath ' 0 9 the Supreme
Court held that the placing of an association on the Attorney General's list
as a subversive organization gave the association standing to sue for
declaratory and injunctive relief. Although there were several opinions, all
of those written by the members of the majority agreed that the organiza-
tion was deprived of constitutional rights by the listing. Justices Black and
Douglas would have found the listing itself unconstitutional, but the other
members of the majority based their opinions upon procedural and pro-
cedural due process grounds, the latter involving lack of notice and fair
hearing. In the latest cases,"" the Court similarly failed-over a stinging
dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Harlan-to
decide whether the registration provisions could constitutionally be applied
to front organizations, and vacated the registration orders on the grounds
of stale evidence.-"- Mr. Justice Black, however, indicated that he would
have held the entire act unconstitutional." 2
organization under a cloud of suspicion, as well as force it to interrupt its activities
in order to defend itself for extended periods at great cost. In the congressional
debate, the opponents of the bill pointed to the fact that merely being brought before
the Board would damage the reputation of an organization. Moreover, a board
finding will burden an organization with a stigma which can not effectively be
removed by a subsequent court reversal. See 96 CONG. REc. 15712 (1950) (remarks
of Senator Murphy).
108 See text accompanying note 89 supra.
109 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
110 American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 85 Sup. Ct. 1148
(1965) ; Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. SACB, 85 Sup. Ct. 1153 (1965).
111 See text accompanying note 38 supra.
212 think that among other things the Act is a bill of attainder; that it
imposes cruel, unusual and savage punishments for thought, speech, writing,
petition and assembly; and that it stigmatizes people for their beliefs, asso-
ciations and views about politics, law, and government. The Act has bor-
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b. The Public Interest
The registration of the Communist Party exposed to the public the
link between a functioning organization and the Communist movement.
The Communist front proceedings, however, have resulted mainly in forcing
organizations to disband. Consequently, the public has not been given
information about a presently existing organization, and the Communist
movement is merely forced to reorganize and redeploy certain of its
energies. Opponents of the bill in Congress argued that the effect of the
act would be ultimately to drive the Communists further underground,1 1 3
and this was one of the major reasons President Truman gave for vetoing
the act. 1 4 In light of the rather doubtful results obtained by a registration
order, one may question the vast amounts of time and energy expended in
seeking such orders. After fifteen years, and twenty-two front proceedings,
only six organizations have been finally ordered to register, and three of
these claim they no longer exist.
The public interest involved in these cases is that of self-preservation,
but it should be recognized that the nature of the threat posed to that
interest by Communist fronts is quite different from that posed by com-
munist-action organizations. If the immediate objectives of the latter were
attained, violent overthrow of the Government would be the consequence.
Such is not the case with communist-front groups, for their immediate
objectives can only be attained through legal action within the context of
rowed the worst features of old laws intended to put shackles on the minds
and bodies of men, to make them confess to crime, to make them miserable
while in this country, and to make it a crime even to attempt to get out of it.
It is difficult to find laws more thought-stifling than this one even in countries
considered the most benighted. . . . My vote is to hear the case now and
hold the law to be what I think it is-a wholesale denial of what I believe
to be the constitutional heritage of every freedom-loving American.
American Comm. for Protection of Foreign Born v. SACB, 85 Sup. Ct 1148, 1155-56
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting). (Footnote omitted.)
113 See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC 13760 (1950) (remarks of Representative Jackson);
id. at 14190 (remarks of Senator Lehman).
1 14 The president's veto message may be found at 96 CONG. RZc. 15629 (1950).
The legislative history relative to the constitutionality of the act presents an amazing
picture. It is clear that the act was prompted by the temper of the times-the nation
was then fighting in Korea, eleven men had just been found guilty of violating the
Smith Act in a widely publicized trial, and the Alger Hiss incident had recently
come to light A reading of the Congressiontal Record indicates how attuned to the
times Congress was. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 13725-7 (1950) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Rankin) ; id. at 13737 (remarks of Representative Wolverton) ; id. at 13738
(remarks of Representative Davis) ; id. at 13745 (remarks of Representative Doyle) ;
id. at 13748 (remarks of Representative Allen); id. at 14298 (remarks of Senator
Wiley) ; id. at 15647 (remarks of Senator Langer). The astonishing fact is that
Congress was well aware that the act may have been unconstitutional, see, e.g., 96
CONG. R c. 13745 (1950) (remarks of Representative Doyle) ; id. at 15701 (remarks
of Senator Kefauver), but they were willing to pass the bill and leave it up to the
courts to decide the question, because they felt the times demanded such action.
Another factor motivating congressional support may well have been the labelling of
the bill as anti-Communist, and the great danger a Congressman in the election year
of 1950 would have run if he voted against a bill so labeled. See 96 CoNG. REc.
13765 (1950) (remarks of Representative O'Hara) ; id. at 13768 (remarks of Repre-
sentative Burdick).
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our present governmental system. Thus, even if front organizations are
successful, the dangers they pose to society are not nearly as great as those
threatened by a communist-action organization.
2. The Present Law
Since the NAACP cases, in which the Supreme Court for the first
time squarely recognized and protected freedom of association, Uphaus v.
Wyman is the only case not involving the Communist Party in which
the Court has permitted that freedom to be reduced. Even in Uphaus,
however, there was some question whether freedom of association was
actually involved.115 Moreover, the concern of the state in that case was
not the association itself, but the members of the Communist Party who
might be in it. Since the Internal Security Act has separate provisions
which enable the Government to seek the identity of Party members,1"
registration of Communist fronts cannot be justified on this basis. The
actual goal of the registration proceedings would thus appear to be the
reduction of an organization's effectiveness as a purveyor of ideas. Such
a reduction of the normal scope of first amendment rights has been per-
mitted by the Court only in cases involving the Communist Party, and then
only because that group advocated violent overthrow of the government.
In front cases, the attempted reduction extends to organizations advocating
constitutionally protected ideas, and the only justification is the showing
of a purported link with the Communist Party. Only Uphaus found such
a justification constitutionally sufficient to justify reduction, and that case
is easily distinguished on its facts. The inescapable conclusion is that
the Court is faced, in the communist-front cases, with a novel constitutional
question.
3. Overriding Constitutional Interests
In any first amendment case, the Court must weigh the extent of the
reduction and decide whether it is outweighed by the governmental interest
involved. Frequently, however, the Court must look beyond this bare
balance and gauge the effect of its decision upon society in general. 1 7 The
Communist front cases present this broader question, for they represent
issues pivotal to a democracy.
By curtailing the operations of these organizations, the Government is
to some extent stifling the free interchange of ideas." 8 . Because of the
15 See text accompanying note 101 supra.
116 See 64 Stat. 993-94 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 786(d) (4) (1958) (registration of
membership lists by association) ; 64 Stat. 995 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 787 (1958) (reg-
istration by members of association if association does not register them).
117 This element is at the core of the "prophylactic" rules which have become
part of the Constitution.
1's See Chafee, The Registration of "Communist-Front" Organizations in; the
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1384-85 (1950).
COMMUNIST-FRONT REGISTRATION
label "Communist front," an organization's ideas will not be measured by
their intrinsic worth, but rather, to a great extent, by how the Government
has labelled the advocate of those ideas. Where the ideas represent speech
not protected by the first amendment, or where they aim at overthrowing
the government, there may be a great public interest in seeing the advocate
labelled and his background clearly exposed. 119 When the ideas are pro-
tected by the first amendment, however, labelling becomes an unwarranted
conditioning of the public mind by the Government. It would thus appear
a very dangerous precedent to allow the Government to make the fine
judgments involved here,120 for such decisions can have a great effect on the
political thought of the nation. Because of the possibility of being labelled
as a Communist front by the Government, an organization will be more
reluctant to express views commonly held by the Communist Party. 12 '
Nor is this necessarily limited to unpopular ideas, for an organization can
be denominated a Communist front for advancing ideas the public may be
ready to accept.
The first amendment freedom of political expression lies at the very
heart of our system of government, and although not absolute, it should be
tempered only in the extreme case. The Communist Party case was such
an instance, for it involved a foreign-dominated organization whose avowed
aim was the overthrow of the government. Beyond the area of criminal
conspiracy in which the self-preservation argument may properly be in-
voked, there is no justification for requiring registration. Where the
Government begins to limit the expression of ideas which pose no threat
to self-preservation, and which represent speech protected by the first
amendment, it has exceeded constitutional limits. As Mr. Justice Douglas
has pointed out,2 2 there are a myriad of interlinkings between organizations
in this nation, and it should not be the task of the Government to probe
the intimacies of these relations. 12 It has been well said that:
"19 Cf. Sutherland, Freedom and Internal Security, 64 HAmv. L. Rzv. 383, 415-16
(1951).
12 See GELLHORN, AmamcA.r RIGHTS 87-89 (1960),; CHAFEz THE BLESSINGS
OF Lrmm-r 152-56 (1956); Chafee, The Registration of "Communist-Front" Organi-
zations it the Mundt-Nixon, Bill, 63 Hagv. L. Rv. 1382, 1388-89 (1950). Professor
Gellhorn points out that perils which are sought to be suppressed are regularly over-
estimated, and society should conserve its strength for real problems. He argues
that where immediacy of danger is not the test, boundaries will become increasingly
difficult to draw. GEL.HoRN, op. cit. supra at 83-84. The opponents of the bill in
Congress insisted that the real danger of Communism lay in espionage and sabotage,
and that the bill did not begin to reach these dangers. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 14405
(1950) (remarks of Senator Douglas) ; id. at 15525 (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
1 1 This aspect of the statute, in effect making the extent of adherence to views
expressed by the Soviet Union one of the tests for whether or not an organization is
a Communist front, is severely criticized by Professor Gellhorn. GEILHoRN, op. cit.
supra note 120, at 89. See also sources cited in note 43 supra.
'= Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 565 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
=2 See Chafee, The Registration of "Communist-Front" Organizations in the
Mundt-Nixon Bill, 63 HAv. L. REv. 1382, 1387 (1950).
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[I] t cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to
protect the public against false doctrine. The very purpose of the
First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming a
guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press,
speech and religion. In this field every person must be his own
watchman for the truth, because the forefathers did not trust any
government to separate the true from the false for us.2-
Lawrence J. Rothenberg
'.
4 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring).
